Empirical evidence on imperfect information in the parking market [WP] by Albalate, Daniel, 1980- & Gragera Lladó, Albert
 
 
 
Empirical evidence on imperfect information 
in the parking market 
 
Daniel Albalate (Universitat de Barcelona) 
Albert Gragera (Universitat de Barcelona) 
 
 
 
25/04/2017 
 
 
CÀTEDRA PASQUAL MARAGALL D’ECONOMIA I TERRITORI 
 
COL·LECCIÓ DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL 
 
Entitat col·laboradora:  
 
WORKING PAPER 02/2017 
Empirical evidence on imperfect information in the parking market Albalate and Gragera (2017b) 
 
  1 / 28 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Parking economics literature main attention has been paid to the cruising externality and garage market 
power issues, but all works assume that perfect information exists. But imperfect information may arise as 
(1) drivers may not know all available options in their choice set; and (2) they lack of information to 
evaluate them; further exacerbating already mentioned distortions. In this paper we provide compelling 
evidence on the existence and extent of information frictions in this market; based on the case study of 
Barcelona. We also test whether parkers’ lack of knowledge translates into undesirable market outcomes. 
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1 Introduction 
Parking policy has lately gained much attention as it is seen as a convenient and 
effective travel demand management tool to boost transport systems efficiency tackling 
car usage related problems. But parking market behavior is quite complex to asses and 
policy makers need further insights on how to design policies that drive the market 
towards efficiency. This has motivated a growing body of literature that vastly focused 
on the analysis of parking market distortions and how to fix them. 
The general tendency to set curbside prices low (or free) translates into 
excessive parking demand forcing some drivers to cruise around for an empty spot, 
where each parker imposes an external cost on all other drivers (search cost). This 
phenomenon is pervasive (Shoup, 2005; and Van Ommeren et al. 2012) and its 
associated welfare loss is very relevant (Inci et al. 2015).
1
 An additional distortion that 
contributes to the previous is the fact that garage parking (curbside parking main 
alternative) is characterized by construction scale economies for garages, that imposes 
its discrete spacing and confers them some degree of localized market power (Arnott, 
2006). Theoretical works have suggested different policy interventions to achieve full 
efficiency (eliminate cruising) or at least induce welfare gains; which include regulating 
price differential between garages and the curb, hourly differentiated curbside parking 
                                                 
1
 Shoup (2005) shows that about 30% of trips are affected and they spend on average 8 minutes 
cruising. Van Ommeren et al. (2012) suggests that cruising is mainly a parking regulation issue as cities 
with curbside regulated parking spaces and proper fare differential with respect to garages show almost 
absent cruising levels. Inci et al. (2015) estimate that the external cost of cruising is about 15% of the 
average wage rate for the case of Istanbul (equivalent to $2.7/h for the US). 
Empirical evidence on imperfect information in the parking market Albalate and Gragera (2017b) 
 
  3 / 28 
 
fees, time-varying and uniform curbside parking fees (see Inci, 2015 for an extensive 
review). 
However, such conclusions relay on the assumption that parkers have perfect 
information. Spatial competition models (for example Arnott, 2006; Calthrop and 
Proost, 2006 or Inci and Lindsey, 2015) assume that drivers choose whether to search 
for a curbside empty spot or directly proceed to park in a garage. This implies that only 
curbside parking search is costly; the time required to locate a garage and park there is 
neglected. They are implicitly assuming that garage locations and attributes (like price) 
are known and perfectly observed by drivers. But a closer look to the parking market 
suggests that the validity of such assumption might be challenged. 
It is rather plausible that imperfect information may arise from the fact that: (1) 
drivers may not know all the available options in their parking choice set; (2) they lack 
of information to evaluate them (prices and quality). Even if they want to earn this 
knowledge they will need to involve in some amount of search, which is also costly. 
The lack of such information does not allow them to maximize their utility and has 
consequences on the market outcomes that have not been considered in previous 
research. 
The relevance of imperfect information as a market failure has for long been 
recognized by information economics literature in a wide variety of sectors (Stigler, 
1961; Akerlof, 1970; Diamond, 1971; Stiglitz, 1989, 2000 and 2002); and parking 
market is not different. Information is costly, so it is rational for consumers not to be 
fully informed. Under this situation markets tend to be characterized by price 
dispersions not explained by product characteristics differences. Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977) suggest that when individuals have a different search cost, lower price firms will 
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sell both to the well informed consumers and the uninformed ones that have the chance 
to purchase there (random); while high price firms will only be able to sell to the 
uninformed consumers. In this case imperfect information will allow firms to 
imperfectly discriminate consumer depending on their information level.
2
 Garages will 
take advantage of non-optimal choice decisions made by consumers, allowing them to 
charge higher prices even with a large number of firms in the market or relatively small 
search costs. Furthermore, garages can also act strategically increasing consumers’ 
search cost through obfuscation by simply not disclosing all relevant purchase 
information or making it more complex to understand; which allows them to increase 
prices (Ellison and Wolitzky, 2012). All this suggests that already highlighted parking 
market distortions (cruising and localized market power) might be further exacerbated 
due to the interplay with imperfect information. In such scenario, full efficiency cannot 
be attained even theoretically suggested interventions are implemented, as some 
cruising may remain. 
The presence of imperfect information in the parking market can be inferred 
from the fact that there is a growing demand for such good, as many specialized 
information gathering start-up firms are currently providing it as pre-trip or in-route 
information assistance.
3
 Parking behavior literature has focused on measurement of 
parking search and the characterization the strategies followed by drivers (i.e: Polak and 
Axhausen, 1990; Bonsall and Palmer, 2004; Weinberger et al., 2017 or Karaliopoulos et 
                                                 
2
 They highlight that well informed consumers impose a positive externality on the uninformed 
ones by incentivizing the existence of low price firms. If there are enough well informed consumers 
market equilibrium prices will tend to the competitive ones. 
3
 Examples of such firms are Parkopedia, ParkMe, SpotHero or Bestparking. 
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al., 2017). The relevance of the parking search issue and available technology has 
motivated a large body of literature devoted to the development of parking assistance 
systems (i.e: Caicedo, 2009, 2010 and Shin and Jun, 2014); that are information 
provision and guidance tools for parkers aimed at reducing search cost. 
However, all previous literature seem to implicitly assume that parkers know the 
spatial/temporal availability and characteristics of garages stock as the main substitute 
to curbside parking. Yet we believe that imperfect information impact on market 
outcomes is still missing in the parking literature, as the lack of information of drivers 
on prices and “quality” has not been addressed. 
In this paper we provide evidence on the existence and extent of information 
frictions in the garage market; based on the case study of Barcelona. Moreover, we also 
examine whether the level of information affects parkers’ garage choice behavior that 
translates into market outcomes (prices). We find that information frictions are so 
extensive that active search during a given trip does not help parkers to end up paying 
lower fares. Only passive information acquisition through experience seems to increase 
parkers’ knowledge of the available garage stock that helps them to achieve cheaper 
parking options. We also find evidence of price obfuscation that might allow garage 
operators to exploit consumers’ ignorance. 
As far as we know, this is the first paper to analyze the imperfect information 
distortion in the parking sector. Our findings are a relevant contribution to parking 
theoretical models that should also account for the exacerbating cruising externality and 
garage market power. But also for empirical works on parking competition and demand 
modeling. It also suggest the need to empirically test whether imperfect information is 
as relevant in other cities. Addressing existent information frictions is a relevant policy 
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issue if parking market efficiency is ought to be achieved; which we believe deserves 
more attention in future research. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
parking market in Barcelona and parkers’ knowledge level; showing descriptive 
evidence on parkers’ knowledge level and costly search. Section 3 describes our 
empirical test of information role on parkers’ paid prices, where results are also 
discussed. Section 4 summarizes our main conclusions. 
2 The parking market in Barcelona and garage parkers’ knowledge 
level 
Barcelona applies a comprehensive curbside parking regulation covering almost 
the entire area of the city called ÀREA; which establishes dedicated spaces for 
commercial activities, mixed use (parking permit to residents but charge visitors), 
resident-exclusive and hauling activities; introduced in 2005 and expanded in 2009. The 
total current global curbside parking supply is about 140.000 car spaces and 48.000 are 
regulated (DB Aj.BCN, 2015).
4
 These spaces are split into regulatory zones with four 
fee/hour bands for commercial spaces (from 1.08€/hour to 2.50€/hour) and two bands 
for mixed use spaces (2.75€/hour – 3.00€/hour). On commercial spaces all parkers are 
considered as visitors; while mixed use spaces allow both visitors and residents to park 
(the later at a reduced fee of 0.20€/day). Free parking only remains available during 
operating hours in the outskirt of the city where parking demand is much lower. 
                                                 
4
 From the global city parking supply about 73.000 are free parking spaces; the remaining 
include hauling and other reserved spaces where regular car parkers are not allowed to park. 
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Off-street parking supply is extensive, with a global estimated figure of 650.000 
parking spaces (DB Aj.BCN, 2015). However, following Albalate and Gragera (2017a) 
only about 114.000 spaces are provided by public-access garages. The public-access 
garage supply is mainly provided by the private sector (78 per cent of facilities); with an 
extremely atomized market structure with only NN and SABA managing a relatively 
large number of garages run under a same brand name and image, 5 per cent and 3 per 
cent respectively. The public sector has a leading role both by means of public operators 
(8 per cent) and price-regulated facilities in concession regime (14 per cent). Such role 
strives on the fact that public sector has been the only new entrant in the market due to 
the off-street supply expansion policy followed in the past to promote the shift of 
curbside demand to garages combined with the high land acquisition cost for private 
operators (that public sector can circumvent by placing garages on public land). The 
City Council integrated both curbside regulated spaces and publicly managed garages in 
a single parking operator (BSM), even each of them represents a different business unit 
within the same company. 
Garages establish a fee per minute and many of them differentiate it depending 
on parking duration, even some convoluted schedules are reported that might hinder 
consumers’ ability to calculate the price to be paid. The city mean overall garage fare 
for the first parking hours is 3.32€/hour (Std.Dev 0.50€/hour); that is reduced to 
3.19€/hour for the second parking hour and 3.14€/h for the third. This shows a very 
mild price discrimination as the reduction for the second and third parking hour is just 4 
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to 5 per cent, respectively.
5
 Generally discounts for long, overnight and subsequent days 
stays are reported in the garage price menu. Also discounts and special rates are offered 
purchasable in advance, but non-discount users represent the majority of parking 
transactions (following figures reported by BSM, see footnote 17 in Albalate and 
Gragera, 2017a). Prices charged by public garages are fixed by the public authority and 
respond solely to political decisions. Publicly managed garages apply a 3.05€/hour fare 
(non-progressive) in all their facilities. All concessions are subject to price-cap 
regulation that is usually binding, ensuring cost recovery and return on investment to 
the private investor. The concessions’ mean first parking hour fare is 3.09€/hour 
(Std.Dev. 0.38€/hour). 
Further detail on the specific characteristics of the parking market in Barcelona 
can be found in Gragera and Albalate (2016) and Albalate and Gragera (2017a). 
In order to evaluate the level of knowledge that parkers have about the parking 
market, we conducted a survey to 576 respondents among garage parkers at 61 different 
facilities spread throughout Barcelona, mainly concentrated at the Central Business 
District and its surroundings.
6
 Specific survey locations are depicted in Figure 1. We 
                                                 
5
 It is especially striking to compare those figures with the ones reported by Lin and Wang for 
the case of New York City (Manhattan); where mean first parking hour $12.67/hour (Std.Dev. $4.4/hour) 
and the additional second hours adds up just $3.38/hour, a reduction of up to 73 per cent. 
6
 All empirical approach undertaken are based on a sample that discarded the responses from 
parking subscribers, parkers that report having some type of discounted fare and all-day parkers. 
Additionally, each model uses the amount of observations that have the complete information for all 
variables used; dropping all observations where respondents were unable/unwilling to report specific 
information. 
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designed the questionnaire to gather information on garage parkers’ trip and 
demographic characteristics, search activity and their knowledge on prices and available 
alternatives. The information was gathered in a single wave during two consecutive 
weeks on February 2016, during business hours. The survey was conducted by 
interviewers to parkers that were about to leave the garage facility after parking their car 
or when they return to pick it up (before payment). Garage prices and characteristics are 
extracted from a parking inventory conducted during the same period, as described in 
Albalate and Gragera (2017a). Curbside information has been provided by BSM and the 
neighborhood data is made publicly available by the Barcelona City Council Statistics 
Department. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
2.1 Descriptive evidence of imperfect information 
2.1.1 Involvement in search activity 
Our survey data suggests that garage might exert a significant degree of 
localized market power in line with previous evidence (Albalate and Gragera, 2017a), as 
96.6 per cent of respondents reveal that their main reason to park in a given facility is 
proximity to their destination. The average walking time to final destination is restricted 
to just 5.8 min (st.dev. 5.5min); which assuming a walking speed of 0.5m/s translates 
into a 300m walk (more than 90 per cent of respondents do not walk more than 500m). 
Walking time distribution in our sample is reported on Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Parkers in our sample conduct very low search activity of all types. Regarding 
active search for a garage, only 6.9 per cent of respondents report to have searched for 
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one. Choice of the garage facility seems to largely relay on previous experience, as 78 
per cent report that they already knew the facility and the remaining report to have 
reached it either following traffic signs (5 per cent) or they saw the garage sign while 
cruising around the area (17%). Only 3.4% state that they conducted any sort of pre-trip 
search for garage information, as information platforms (start-up firms) have yet a very 
low market penetration. About 17.8 per cent of respondents report that they previously 
searched for a curbside spot; while only a marginal 1.2 per cent state they additionally 
searched for garage after looking after an empty curbside spot. Further analyzing our 
data shows that no demographic or trip characteristics stands out having a significant 
difference in the mean level of search for garages. 
[insert summary table here] 
2.1.2 Knowledge of available garage alternatives 
This low level of search activity is particularly striking as or survey data 
suggests that parkers have a very relevant lack of knowledge of the available garage 
options they have at hand. Only 51 per cent of parkers report to specifically know the 
existence of at least an alternative garage in the area; but as far as 78 per cent of those 
report not to know the fare the alternative garage facility will charge them and 65 per 
cent report not to know its characteristics. Jointly with localized market power this 
might plausibly impose a huge burden to competition between garages, in line with the 
results of Albalate and Gragera (2017a). 
In order to gain some insight on our data we test whether the differences in the 
mean level of knowledge about the availability of alternative garages between different 
groups in our sample are statistically significant, as reported in Table 1. The mean 
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knowledge of garage alternatives available is higher for those who have previously 
visited the specific garage facility compared to those who don’t, supporting evidence on 
the acumulation of knowledge of available alternatives through experience. This does 
also happen for those who involve in active search for garages but the contrary for those 
who previously searched for a spot on the curb. Having searched for a curbside spot 
first might indicate that it is a preferred option for them and might less frecuently park 
in garages (having less previous experience); which is also confirmed by comparing 
means between both groups with a t-test. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
2.1.3 Knowledge of prices 
Not only the parkers do not seem to know much about available garage 
alternatives, their characteristics and prices, but they also lack of knowledge on how 
much they will be charged in the garage they have just parked. In particular, our survey 
data suggests that 75 per cent of respondents report not to know the fares. When asked 
about how much it will cost the first hour of parking their average guess is 2.92€/h 
(Std.Dev. 0.96€/h) when its true sample mean is 3.18€/h (Std.Dev. 0.33€/h); with no 
statistically different mean between those who report to know and not to know the price. 
We measure parkers’ price misperception as the difference between their fare guess and 
the actual fare applied at the garage they parked their car; which gives an average of -
0.27€/hour (Std.Dev. 1.04€/hour), and its distribution is reported in Figure 3. 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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2.1.4 Obfuscation 
Another relevant aspect is the fact that price menus are visible from the street 
(outside the facility) only in 15 per cent of the garages in Barcelona, about 78 per cent 
only show such information inside the facility and the remaining 7 per cent do not even 
show it forcing parkers to ask if they want to know how much they will be charged.
7
 In 
our surveyed sample we have 70 per cent of respondents that purchase in garages that 
only show price information inside the facility; while the remaining 30 per cent 
purchase at garages that do show it outside. 
All garages that report their price menus specify it in terms of fare per minute as 
it is compulsory by law since 2006.
8
 In order to describe the fare per minute they tend to 
display it as a fraction number reported using 2 to 6 decimal digits; which might make 
pretty difficult for customers to use in price computation. Many of them do not apply a 
flat fare but a differentiated fare per minute depending on parking duration, generally 
decreasing with the length of the stay. Garages also generally report in the price menus 
the available discounts for overnight stays and subsequent days. 
All this further increases the complexity of the price menu and can potentially 
help garage operators to obfuscate prices, making it more difficult for parkers to 
                                                 
7
 Public Access garages information provision is regulated by law 40/2002, but it only requires 
that garage operators “make prices easily perceived prior formalizing the service contract” without any 
specification of the format, the means or where it is done 
(http://consum.gencat.cat/temes_de_consum/aparcaments/index.html). Note that reporting the price inside 
is imposing a high cost if parkers will reject to park in that facility ones they learn the price. 
8
 Ley 44/2006, de 29 de diciembre, de Mejora de la Protección de los Consumidores y Usuarios 
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precisely realize the fare they will be charged (increasing parkers search cost). Thus, we 
include two different measures to account for potential obfuscation. On the one hand we 
measure price salience as a dummy variable, with the value of 1 if the price is not 
visible from outside the garage facility and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, we account 
for the complexity in how garages report the fare per minute, length of stay price 
differentiation and discounts taking advantage of the coded price menu string length, 
computed as the number of characters it contains. The average price complexity faced 
by the respondents to our survey is 38 characters (std.dev. 27 ch.). An example of some 
coded prices menus and their corresponding complexity is reported in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[insert price complexity histogram] 
2.2 The value of information: expected gains vs search cost 
We have seen so far that parkers in Barcelona conduct very low levels of search, 
which based on previous evidence is plausibly explained by its potentially high 
associated cost.
9
 It is rational to think that drivers may involve in search only if the 
marginal gain by search is higher or equal to its marginal cost. So we measure the 
expected gains of perfect information they might achieve as the difference between the 
first hour fare mean and the lowest garage fare within the relevant market reported by 
each respondent, as a buffer within walking distance to final destination. This gives us 
an intuition of what would be the difference in fares paid by a perfectly informed driver 
                                                 
9
 Unfortunately, the low number of parkers involving in search activity precludes us from taking 
a more sophisticated and reliable empirical approach to estimate search cost. 
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with respect to one paying the expected market price when purchasing simply at 
random, other things being equal. 
In our sample this yields a 0.30€/hour differential (Std.Dev. 0.27€/hour) 
showing relatively mild incentives to search. Note that this potential cost saving is about 
the same magnitude of parkers’ garage price misperception, suggesting that they might 
not even realize that such saving exists at all. 
When analyzing the deviation from perfect information, computed as the first 
hour fare difference between the lowest price and the fare they actually pay; it yields a 
mean value of -0.17€/hour (Std.Dev. 0.27€/hour) that suggests that parkers are 
purchasing at higher prices than the lowest possible. When analyzing the deviation from 
purchasing at random, measured as the difference between the mean first hour fare 
within the relevant market and the price they actually pay; it yields a mean value of 
0.13€/hour (Std.Dev. 0.31€/hour) suggesting that parkers do possess some amount of 
information that allow them to purchase better than at the expected market price. 
To have a clearer picture we need to confront this expected gain of perfect 
information with its expected cost (search). We have no data on the search process 
followed by drivers, but we can give a fair enough approximation of the expected cost 
with a back of the envelope calculation by assuming that parkers follow a sequential 
search approach.
10
 This is an equivalent problem to compute the probability of picking 
                                                 
10
 We believe this is a fair enough approximation to expected search cost, as a very low number 
of drivers involve in pre-trip search and the parking information systems/platforms do not have much 
market penetration yet. Note in addition that on our setting the only way to fully know garages prices in 
the vast majority of cases will be to visit each facility; without taking into account neither that fare is 
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the cheapest garage option from a sample without replacement (assuming all of them 
are equally distant from the drivers’ final destination). In such scenario the probability 
of finding the cheapest facility is 1/n, where n is the number of garages in the relevant 
market. Using the mean values in our sample we can compute the mean expected cost of 
sequential search assuming there are 4 garages (Std.Dev. 2.9 garages) placed 200 meters 
apart (Std.Dev. 97 meters); where parkers drive from one to another at 10km/h and their 
time is valued at 9€/hour. The probability of picking up the cheapest in the first visit to 
a garage facility is 0.25, and so is on the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 4
th
 visit conditional on failures in 
the previous. Thus the expected search cost would be 1.87€, which well offsets the 
previous computed expected gains for the respondents in our sample. 
To translate this result more generally to the whole city, the average value of 
perfect information in Barcelona is 0.67 €/hour (Std.Dev. 0.29€/hour) and its 
distribution is shown in Figure 4 (based on the data collected in Albalate and Gragera, 
2017a). From that figure it is easy to see that in many areas it is too low to compensate 
assumed search cost. Precisely those sites with higher value of information are those 
with higher number of competing facilities. This implies that even expected gains might 
be higher, they might be well offset by also higher search costs if the main way to gain 
information by drivers is on-site search. The more garages are available the higher will 
be the expected number of visits to find the cheapest fare. Table 3 shows the detailed 
expected search cost per garage visited, suggesting it is very unlikely that drivers 
generally search for more than 2 garage facilities given the value perfect information 
yields. 
                                                                                                                                               
quite usually not visible from the outside (imposing an additional cost if consumers want to learn the 
price) nor the cognitive burden price discrimination scheme might also impose. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
Additionally, we also find evidence that conducting active search for a garage 
does not actually help drivers find a cheaper parking option for the current specific trip. 
On the contrary, those that search end up with an average lower deviation from mean 
prices, meaning they are less able to purchase at lower than mean prices which does not 
differentiate from purchasing at random. This is a reflection of how poor is information 
in this market. Search might only be a pain to gather information by experience for 
future visits to the area. Table 4 reports the results of a t-test comparing the means of the 
subsamples of respondents that conduct active search and those who do not. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
To overcome the lack of knowledge and potentially high search cost drivers 
might want to stick to already known options as 77 per cent select the garage facility 
based on previous experience (as long as they are satisfied with it); or otherwise relay 
on brand names as a signal to infer garage attributes, as long as 80 per cent of them 
report to know at least some of the main garage brand names. This argument is in line 
with the evidence from consumer behavior literature (Baels et al., 1981). 
All in all, we believe that previous descriptive evidence shows that in order to 
choose a garage drivers conduct very little search (of any kind), they know very little 
about the stock of available garage alternatives and their prices, seem to largely rely on 
previous experience, face relatively low expected marginal gains with respect to the 
marginal search cost and potential obfuscation strategies by garages that might further 
increase it. 
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3 Empirical analysis of the role of information on paid prices 
Previous section provides compelling evidence of informational frictions in the 
parking market. However, what is relevant to economists is not how much drivers 
ignore about parking options and prices or how many of them are not informed enough, 
but whether this ignorance implies that market outcomes deviate from the perfect 
competition scenario. Thus, we will test whether the level of information has an impact 
on the price paid by parkers; and whether garages obfuscation strategies might further 
increase them. 
3.1 Models specifications 
The intuition behind our approach is that perfectly informed drivers would be 
able to accurately identify available garage options and their characteristics (including 
prices) and consequently maximize the utility they get from garage choice. Other things 
being equal they should be able to choose a cheaper parking option. Those with inferior 
information levels might just be able to partially optimize their decision; while not 
informed parkers would be expected to simply purchase at random. Information level 
will depend on previous parking experience in the trip destination area or by conducting 
any type of search (pre-trip or on-site) in order to stablish at least a subset of available 
garage parking opportunities. We test this hypothesis by estimating three different type 
of models. 
First, we simply estimate a regression model of the price paid for the first 
parking hour on parkers’ information level and garages’ information provision (Model 
1). This will give us an idea of whether the conditional mean of prices for the whole 
sample is affected by parkers’ knowledge and search activity. This is, whether 
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information dimensions make parkers pay higher or lower fares. In order to have 
comparable prices across respondents we use the first hour fare (list price), as we also 
stated in the questionnaire when asked parkers about their price perception. We estimate 
Model 1 with a log linear specification, so reported coefficients can be interpreted as 
semi-elasticities. 
[Insert Model 1 equaiton] 
Secondly, as it is plausible to assume that there are decreasing marginal returns 
on search that make not optimal for drivers to be fully informed (Ratchford, 1980); we 
estimate three binary outcome models regressing: (a) the probability of paying the 
lowest firs hour fare, (b) the probability of paying below the mean first hour fare and (c) 
the probability of paying above the mean first hour fare within the relevant market on 
the information dimensions (Models 2, 3 and 4, respectively).
11
 In contrast to models 1a 
and 1b, those give us an idea of how well are drivers choosing among the available 
garages within their relevant market in terms of prices. These models estimate how 
much more or less likely is that a parker purchases in a specific price segment garage 
for a change in the information dimensions. Dichotomous response variables are simply 
computed by comparing parkers paid first hour parking fare and the mean fare applied 
within the relevant market for each respondent. This means that the dependent variable 
in Model 2 is 1 when    is equal to the minimum      within the relevant market for 
parker  ; and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Model 3 is 1 when    is strictly 
                                                 
11
 We assume that the relevant market for each respondent is a buffer of the walking distance to 
his final destination around the garage facility where the survey was conducted. We estimate the walking 
distance based on reported walking time to final destination assuming 0.6 meters/second walking speed. 
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lower than the mean fare ( ̅) within the relevant market for parker  ; and 0 otherwise. 
While Model 4 defines its dependent variable as 1 when    is strictly higher than  ̅ 
within the relevant market for parker  ; and 0 otherwise. Note that models 3 and 4 are 
sort of reciprocal to each other. Models 2 to 4 reported estimates are the odds ratio for a 
logit regression model (exponentiated coefficients). 
[Insert Model 2 to 4 equation] 
And third, we estimate a regression model of the deviation from the mean fare 
within the relevant market area (Model 5), in order to be able to quantify how much 
each information dimensions contributes to the higher/lower deviation in prices with 
respect to purchasing at random (mean price). The dependent variable in Model 5 is 
defined as the difference   ̅     . This yields a positive deviation when the paid price 
is lower than mean fare, meaning that drivers are purchasing better than at random 
presumably by having a higher understanding of the available stock of garages and their 
characteristics. And the opposite when the deviation is negative. Model 5 reports the 
estimated coefficeints for a linear regression model. 
[Insert Model 5 equation] 
We include several information-related variables, as consumer behavior 
literature suggests that consumers (drivers) might acquire/search for information from 
very different sources, not only actively but passively from past experiences or when 
involved in other activities (Baels et al., 1981). It is clear that this information 
acquisition process and its consequences in terms of consumers’ knowledge will depend 
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on the technology of information production and diffusion
12
, the type and the level of 
complexity of its attributes, consumers’ ability to use information, the amount 
purchased, experience with the product, preferences and beliefs (Salop, 1976 and 
Miller, 1993). Thus, we try to capture search activity by accounting for drivers actively 
looking for information including a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the drivers 
has visited at least another garage facility (and 0 otherwise) and another also when they 
conducted some kind of pre-trip search (and 0 otherwise). We also try to capture passive 
information acquisition by including a dummy equal to 1 when the driver reports to 
have previously searched for a curbside spot (and 0 otherwise); whether the driver has 
previously visited the garage facility and the frequency of the trip to that destination, 
computed as the number of trips per month. In order to broadly capture the level of 
knowledge acquired from previous experience we introduce a dummy equal to 1 when 
the driver reports to know available garage alternatives in the area (and 0 otherwise). 
Additionally, we do also include some variables to account for the potential 
impact of obfuscation strategies followed by garage operators that might increase 
parkers search cost, as already highlighted in previous section. We include a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 when the garage does not show the price outside the facility 
(price not salient) and 0 otherwise. But also a continuous variable that tries to capture 
price complexity in how garages report the fare per minute, length of stay price 
differentiation and discounts (price menu). We measure that by coding the price menu 
and counting the number of characters it contain; in order to proxy the cognitive burden 
it might impose to drivers trying to figure out the price they will pay. 
                                                 
12
 It is clear that the cost associated to search information in the web or drive to visit different 
garage facilities would be pretty different. 
Empirical evidence on imperfect information in the parking market Albalate and Gragera (2017b) 
 
  21 / 28 
 
It is relevant to stress that our test does not rely on any assumption on parkers’ 
search behavior or the technology of information production and diffusion, as we solely 
focus on the impact of information levels on the price paid. However, it does rely on our 
ability to control for quality differences between garages. We control for garage 
characteristics by means of operator-specific effects, potential differences in garage 
attractiveness, the level of garage competition, but also competitive and locational 
advantages. 
Operator-specific effects are included to account for quality differences as each 
operator tends to meet some set of standards regarding facility layout, parking spaces, 
signaling, etc; that are assumed to yield very similar parkers’ experience. We control for 
differences in attractiveness of the area (that might allow parkers to achieve higher 
levels of utility by combining multiple activities for the same time of stay) by the 
density of economic activities measured as the ratio of the number of square meters 
associated to economic activities within the relevant market for each parker. The level 
of competing garage alternatives in the area is measured as the average distance 
between the garages located within the relevant market for each parker. To account for 
competitive advantage for each garage we introduce the share of owned competitors by 
the operator where each driver parked his car; as a measure of dominance position in the 
market. The location advantage of a garage is measured by the walking time to the 
parker’s final destination. 
We do also control for drivers’ and trip characteristics heterogeneity. We include 
sex, age and vehicle price as drivers’ traits. Vehicle price is intended to be used as an 
income proxy and it is computed as the actual selling price of the vehicle reported by 
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the respondent.
13
 We also include trip purpose for which we stablish four different 
categories that include: work/study, business, shopping/leisure and personal (most of 
them medical appointments). And we also control for the length of parking stay, as even 
it might give parkers higher expected gains due to a higher total parking expenditure, it 
can also make it more difficult for them to make sense of the price menu when price 
discrimination is applied. 
3.2 Results and discussion 
Results for all models are reported in Table 5. Control variables are not reported 
in that table for sake of clarity. Operator-specific effects are found to be always 
statistically significant; but also the density of economic activities, level of competing 
garage alternatives, competitive and location advantage measures, trip purpose and 
length of parking stay show statistically significant coefficients in various models. We 
should also note that the number of observations vary across logit models (models 2 to 
4) as controlling for operator-specific effects imposes that both success and failure 
observations are included for each of them. Some operators associated observations are 
dropped to avoid perfect collinearity. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Results reported in Table 5 suggest that active information acquisition (either by 
garage, curbside or pre-trip search) does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
                                                 
13
 Actual vehicle selling price has been gathered from an internet price information aggregator 
(coches.com). We also included a depreciated vehicle value taking into account the car purchase year 
reported by the respondent as a robustness check. 
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level of prices paid (Model 1). Models 3 to 5 suggest that when parkers conduct some 
search for alternative garages they end up paying higher than mean prices. Model 4 
suggests that drivers that search for alternative garages are more than twice as likely to 
purchase above the mean price within their relevant market. In particular, Model 5 
shows that they end up paying 0.13€/hour above the mean first hour fare. This implies 
that on-site search might be just a pain for not well enough informed consumers that are 
simply gaining experience that will only pay off in future visits to the area. This 
suggests that information frictions in the case of Barcelona might be somewhat extreme, 
if parkers are not able to achieve gains from active search. 
Passive information acquisition seems to be a more determinant factor on the 
translation of parkers’ knowledge into market outcomes. Models 3 to 5 suggest that 
having some amount of knowledge on the available garage parking stock does increase 
the likelihood that parkers are able to purchase better than at random. Model 3 suggests 
that they are twice as likely to purchase below mean first hour fare within the relevant 
market for each parker. In particular, Model 5 shows that they purchase 0.09€/hour 
below mean prices, which is half of the search cost assumed for a single garage visit in a 
sequential search scheme reported in Table 3. 
Trip frequency shows a mild negative relation with the level of prices paid 
(Model 1); with the sign in line with Sorensen (2000). In this case our results seem to 
suggest that the familiarity with the area does slightly further facilitate the information 
gathering process. Models 2 to 4 suggest that trip frequency does slightly increase the 
probability of purchasing at the lowest available price and below the mean price, with 
odds ratios 1.098 and 1.115 respectively. However, Model 5 shows that the deviation in 
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price from the mean is not statistically significant. This suggests that trip frequency 
might just slightly add up to the broader knowledge measure of available garage stock. 
One of our most relevant results is that we find compelling evidence that price 
obfuscation might be of extreme relevance in the case Barcelona. Model 1 suggest that 
drivers that park at garages where the price is not salient end up paying higher prices 
(12 per cent). The likelihood of purchasing at the lowest available price is cut by more 
than half (Model 2) and they are about 30 times more likely to purchase above mean 
prices (Model 4). Model 5 suggests that parkers facing non-salient prices purchase 
0.17€/hour above the mean first parking hour fare, about the same magnitude of the 
search cost for a single garage visit. We also find a positive relation between price 
complexity of the price menu and the level of price paid by parkers (Model 1), even it 
does not seem to have a statistically significant impact on the probability of purchasing 
below the mean or at the lowest available price. In this regard, it only might raise 
awareness on the potential obfuscation implications of price discrimination with the 
length of stay; which might be relevant for the implementation of interventions  
All this suggests that information frictions are so extensive in Barcelona that the 
only way parkers have currently to overcome them is by a good amount of consumer 
experience. It is plausible to assume that information frictions do also exist in other 
cities, even their relevance needs further investigation. This has implications for parking 
spatial competition models that have till date relied on perfect information assumption 
to draw policy recommendations, which might be hindered by the effects of information 
frictions. But it also has implications for empirical works that implicitly make the same 
assumption when parkers chose between curbside and garage parking. In this sense, 
previously found curbside premium (Kobus et al., 2013; Gragera & Albalate, 2016) 
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might be partially capturing garage information frictions rather than just a higher 
willingness to pay for curbside parking. 
Public authorities should address the imperfect infomation issue as it might be 
causing substantial welfare losses and conferring additional market power to garage 
operators; and additionally this would also hinder any public intervention to eliminate 
cruising. 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the existence of imperfect information in the 
parking market; based on the case study of Barcelona. We conducted a survey to garage 
parkers at different facilities spread throughout Barcelona, gathering information on 
parkers’ trip and demographic characteristics, search activity and their knowledge on 
prices and available alternatives. From such data we provide compelling evidence on 
the extent of information frictions in this market; and we also test whether the level of 
information affects parkers’ garage choice behavior that translates into market outcomes 
(prices).  
On the one hand, we find that active information acquisition (either by garage, 
curbside or pre-trip search) does not help parkers to end up paying lower fares for a 
given trip. On the contrary, drivers that conduct search are more likely to end up paying 
more. On the other hand, passive information acquisition through experience (broad 
knowledge of available garage stock and trip frequency) seems to be a much relevant 
determinant for parkers to achieve cheaper parking options. Additionally, we also find 
compelling evidence that price obfuscation is a determinant of market outcomes in 
Barcelona; which may allow garage operator to take advantage of parkers’ ignorance. 
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This implies that information frictions are so extensive in Barcelona that the 
only way parkers might have to overcome them is by consumer experience. Without a 
pervasive information platform penetration on-site search could just be the price to pay 
by less informed consumers to acquire information by experience; which will only pay 
off in future visits to the area. 
Our findings suggest that addressing information frictions is a relevant policy 
issue if parking market efficiency is ought to be achieved. Previous literature suggested 
market interventions are missing a relevant issue that might hinder their potential 
welfare gains if implemented disregarding such frictions; as in presence of imperfect 
information garages will excise additional market power and even act strategically to 
increase drivers search cost through price obfuscation. This means that even so called 
optimal interventions will need to face the fact that some cruising might remain simply 
due to parkers’ ignorance of available garage stock and its prices. So before 
implementing theoretically suggested interventions imperfect information needs to be 
addressed. 
In order to correct such market distortion public intervention will be required. 
Information is a public good and private agents will unlikely have incentives to provide 
optimal information quantity and quality. Allowing parkers to be more informed in all 
set of parking transactions will require a huge amount of data and standardization 
procedures that might be costly. The fact that information gathering firms are 
blossoming in the parking market, the level of development of parking assistance 
systems, available technology and SmartCity prospects let us think that information 
availability will be ubiquitous and pervasive in urban systems in the near future. The 
implication of the public authority in the data gathering process (to reduce its cost) and 
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setting the right incentives to garage operators to disclose up-to-date relevant 
information might be desirable. A closer collaboration between public authorities, 
information gathering firms and markets stakeholders should be advisable. Additionally, 
it is also relevant to stress that there is evidence that price information provision can 
backlash in form of easier collusion (REFERENCES), so closer monitoring of the 
market would be advisable. 
As far as we know, this is the first paper to analyze the imperfect information 
distortion in the parking sector. Our findings are a relevant contribution to both parking 
theoretical models and empirical works, as they point out to the need to take 
information frictions into account for their potential exacerbating effects on cruising 
externality and garage market power. We believe its relevant market implications 
deserve more attention in future research. 
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